Fort of Goliad, Nov. 14th 1835

To Gen. S. F. Austin, Com. in Ch/ of the Army of the People,

Dear Sir, The facts communicated by Dr. Grant, and others, who accompanied Citizen Yiesca to this place, relative to the present state of affairs in the interior of the Country, presents an unexpected, and highly interesting prospect to the people of Texas. From all that I have been able to learn from these Gentlemen, it seems to be expected by our friends beyond the Rio Grande, that Texas should not only sustain herself against the spread of Centralism, but it is also expected that she will send a force to the interior, and give an impulse to a reaction there. But a small a very small portion, of what is called the liberal party, are either under arms, or even making an effort to resist the strides of the usurper. They do not appear from what I can learn, to be in a state of readiness to receive or to be actuated by a temper to invite, our interference with an armed force, even were it convenient for Texas to take such a step.

An apparently studious, and a prolonged silence of the professed enemies of the military system, concerning the course which Texas ought to take; their forbearance to encourage her, even on paper, in the prosecution of the one she has so nobly, and so fearlessly adopted; their failure to strike there, whilst the enemy is thrilled with dismay here, are symptoms, portending a violent, perhaps a fearful crisis. If no effort is made along the Rio Grande to revive the republic, can we hope for opposition there to the movement of troops from the interior, to reinforce Cos, and recapture Goliad? The population of Texas is mostly of foreign origin. The inhabitants are considered foreigners. May not, and will not this be used as an argument, (and will it not be all powerful as such,) to unite all parties there, for the particular object of crushing Texas? And whilst doing, or trying to do this, time, and opportunity will have been afforded the Dictator, effectually to entrench himself behind the bulwarks of centralism. In this way, he may hope to make, and perhaps may make, a complete conquest of the whole country South of the Rio Grande. This done, he might well afford to withdraw from Texas, and leave her to the unmolested management of her own affairs. In the meantime, a sanguinary war must rage and bleed Campaign after campaign would have been opened-army after army, would have been arrayed, and the resources of the country greatly impoverished, perhaps entirely exhausted.

Thus to divide and conquer, may not be embraced in the plan of the Usurper. But whether it be or not, such a scheme, or something like it, is certainly among possible occurrences, it is even highly probable.

In a former communication, I hinted the policy of a dash at Matamoros, hoping from what I had then heard, that the movement would be approved and sustained by a majority of the people in that section of the country. But now, I fear it would not be. On the contrary, I am fully satisfied that such a movement on the part of Texas, would be as likely to be opposed, as to be approved

But another view of this subject is presented. If Texas cannot achieve her liberation on any easier terms than those above supposed, would it not be wise to use in the prosecution of the war, every weapon which she can seize and weild, now in the hands of the enemy, or within his reach? The post of Matamoros, if properly, and honestly superintended, would yield a very considerable revenue. At present, its income is said to be $100,000 per month. It is said that it ought to produce much more. This is a formidable and efficient weapon. The position is imposing—it is commanding and its occupation would be likely to releive the grate and increasing population of Texas, from the immediate, and more appalling calamities of war. Foreign volunteers can be introduced at that point, as readily, and with as little expense, as at any other; and the position would afford many facilities for annoying the commerce of the enemy, not furnished by any point on the coast of Texas.

This is a subject of immense importance to our country; and the policy which she may adopt in relation to it, may greatly mitigate, or it may multiply, and aggravate, the calamities of the war.

The Gerraro Battallion, our friends from the interior inform us, had reached Saltillo, before they crossed the N. River, and had been ordered to march immediately for Bexar. 400 convicts were also to join them. This information was communicated by Colo. Powers who said it was told to him, a few hours previous.

Cos, no doubt, has strong assurances of the arrival of reinforcements; and on these he must rely, to enable him to hold Bexar.

Your opinion on the subject of this letter is urgently solicited.

P. Dimitt